Issue
Cah. Agric.
Volume 27, Number 3, Mai–Juin 2018
Multifacet realities of work in agriculture. Coordonnateurs : Benoît Dedieu, Julio Cesar Damasceno, Guillermo Neiman, Sandra Schiavi
Article Number 35006
Number of page(s) 6
Section Études originales / Original Studies
DOI https://doi.org/10.1051/cagri/2018024
Published online 22 June 2018
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