Open Access
Issue |
Cah. Agric.
Volume 27, Number 2, Mars-Avril 2018
|
|
---|---|---|
Article Number | 25001 | |
Number of page(s) | 10 | |
Section | Études originales / Original Studies | |
DOI | https://doi.org/10.1051/cagri/2018007 | |
Published online | 28 February 2018 |
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